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FOREWORD
The term “hollow army” became a part of the American political vocabulary more than 30 years ago, in
another election year, 1980. Highlighted by a reporter
in an article about the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s congressional testimony concerning the fiscal year 1981
defense budget, the term became a metaphor for the
Jimmy Carter administration’s alleged neglect of U.S.
national security by political opponents as well as disapproving members of his own party in Congress, who
believed him to be a liability. In the decades following,
the expression broadened to a “hollow force” and its
meaning expanded, serving as a way of describing the
state of ill-prepared military forces in characterizing a
presidential administration’s shortfall in the resources
needed to meet U.S. military commitments.
Today, the term remains a relevant and potent idiom in this so-called “age of austerity,” with the U.S.
defense budget in decline. Both the Barack Obama
administration and its critics have used the term. The
former to explain how its recent strategic guidance
and budget priorities will prevent the “hollowing out”
of U.S. forces and capabilities, the latter as an epithet
suggesting that proposed budget reductions will create such a force.
In this Letort Paper, Professor Jones sets out to
reexamine the existence of a “hollow army” but assessing it within the context of the Carter administration’s defense policy, strategy and budgets, and the
challenges it faced in the early years of building an
all-volunteer force. Using primary sources, including
recently declassified documents, he presents a more
nuanced picture of the political dynamics at work in
both the executive and legislative branches as well
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as the press. He argues that the notion of a “hollow
army” represented a policy argument not only among
members of the two branches of government but also
between political actors: the commander in chief and
a service chief.
Ultimately, this is a story of how the use of metaphor can create a dominant narrative existing for decades and how it is now time to regain perspective.
This is especially true in the current budget environment, where national interests and risk must be examined soberly and rationally given the strategic and
economic realities that the United States confronts in
the coming decade.
		

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The term “hollow army” or the broader expression,
“hollow force,” has as much currency today as it did
when an Army Chief of Staff first uttered the phrase 3
decades ago. In this period of declining defense budgets, the President of the United States, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have articulated how the newly released strategic
guidance and budget priorities represent a concerted
effort not to “hollow out” U.S. forces. They have affirmed their dedication to preventing the re-creation
of the ragged military and disastrous deterioration in
defense capability the Jimmy Carter administration
allowed to occur. Thus, more than 30 years later, the
expression continues to be as politically potent as it
was when first spoken. However, it is also time to reexamine the term “hollow army” and its meaning as
the inevitable tug of war over defense spending gets
underway.
This paper places the “hollow army” metaphor
within its historical context: barely 5 years after the
United States finally disengaged from a major war
(Vietnam), a struggling economy, and an election year
in which a President was only tenuously leading in
the polls and also confronting substantial opposition
from elements of his own political party. In conducting such an assessment, the paper argues that over the
years a specific political reading of these events has
taken hold. It is the purpose of this paper to re-read
the historical events and in doing so, come to a better
understanding of the domestic political and geostrategic environment during Carter’s presidency, the U.S.
Cold War strategy, and the soundness of the assertions
that military leaders made concerning the readiness of
U.S. forces to perform their missions.
vii

In undertaking this reappraisal, the paper explains
how the term “hollow army” came into use. It contends that the Carter administration left the defense
strategy of his predecessors, Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, intact, a strategy that the Army
supported, but it also points out that the Ford administration increased the Army’s force structure without
a commensurate increase in personnel or funding, a
situation that Congress abetted. Second, it argues that
the defense budgets of the Carter presidency honored the American commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as making a
sizable down payment on the Army’s modernization
and readiness. What hampered the meeting of personnel requirements was the end of the draft. Young men
were not inclined to enlist in the new all-volunteer
force. Further, there were a number of problems within the Army regarding its ability to measure readiness
as well as missteps in the development and production of new weapon systems. To its credit, the Carter
administration worked with the Army to improve its
recruiting program and funded new systems consistent with production capabilities.
The paper underscores that Carter grappled with
these issues in a highly politically charged atmosphere. Existing U.S. Government documents, some
declassified at the author’s request, confirm the Congressional Budget Office’s 1994 conclusion that the
“hollow force” argument was more the result of anecdote and press sensationalism. Further, the paper
maintains that the normative assumption that defense
policymaking is above politics, free from political contamination, is idle fancy. Defense policy is an arena
of public policy with its own cultures, routines, and
constituencies. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
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who was no stranger to military culture, pointed out,
every service chief wants additional resources and always will. This was certainly the case with respect to
the “hollow army” debate.
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A “HOLLOW ARMY” REAPPRAISED:
PRESIDENT CARTER, DEFENSE BUDGETS,
AND THE POLITICS OF MILITARY READINESS
The term “hollow army” entered the political vocabulary at a congressional hearing in May 1980, but
it soon became a term used to characterize President
Jimmy Carter’s presidency with respect to the security
of the United States: naïve, misguided, and disastrous.
In the view of Carter’s opponents in both political parties, the President allowed America’s military strength
to deteriorate as part of a “decade of neglect.”1 The
conventional wisdom is that President Ronald Reagan
and the Congress rectified this period of disregard,
negligence, and inattention by the enactment of large
defense budgets that would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
After Carter’s presidency, the term broadened
to include all the U.S. military services—i.e., a “hollow force”—an expression so expansive that it came
to mean an “understaffed, underfunded, or outdated
military.”2 Even after the Cold War ended, American
political and military leaders’ obsession with maintaining high readiness levels persisted, although defense budgets plummeted. “They shuddered,” commented political scientist Richard Betts, “at the specter
of ‘hollow’ armed forces, the image first invoked with
devastating political effect by General Edward Meyer
in 1980 to describe the threadbare state of the Army
after post-Vietnam budget cuts.”3
The term remains pertinent as reflected in the current debate about proposed Department of Defense
(DoD) budget decreases. “What is happening under
Obama is exactly what happened under Carter after
the Vietnam War,” wrote James Jay Carafano, a Heri-
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tage Foundation analyst, in 2010. “Cutting back just
made the military ‘hollow’.”4 According to Carafano’s
Heritage Foundation colleague Baker Spring, the
Barack Obama Defense Budget would not provide adequate resources for the military, “particularly the core
defense program,” by reducing it to 3 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) by the end of the decade.
Further, in Spring’s view, such a reduced level would
produce holes in the U.S. defense position, including
some mixture of an insufficient force structure, a deficient operational capability, retarded modernization,
a “hollow military strategy,” and likely deterioration
of U.S. security commitments.5
These assertions were enlarged a few months
later in a paper entitled “Warning: Hollow Force
Ahead,”published by the Heritage Foundation, the
American Enterprise Institute, and the Foreign Policy
Initiative. The authors claimed that the Obama administration’s proposed defense budget cuts would have
a deleterious effect on the “future of America’s armed
forces and national security,” creating a “‘hollow
force’ characterized by fewer personnel and weapons systems, slowed military modernization, reduced
readiness for operations, and continued stress on the
all-volunteer force.” Such a modern-day “hollow
force” would be “less capable of securing America’s
interests and preserving the international leadership
role that rests upon military preeminence.”6 However,
some of the strength of this argument was weakened
by passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, in which
Congress mandated reductions in federal spending,
including defense spending: $487 billion in savings
from the defense base budget over the next 10 years;
more that $250 billion of those reductions in the Future Years Defense Program (fiscal years 2013-17).
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Nonetheless, the potency of the “hollow force”
metaphor was not lost on the Obama administration,
which recognized that defense budget reductions in
the 2012 election year would likely unleash invectives
from political opponents similar to what Carter suffered 3 decades previously. To soften any criticism as
to how the fiscal year 2013 defense budget cuts were
made or perhaps to preclude end-runs to Congress
and fractious arguments within the DoD, Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta underscored that President
Obama “insisted that reductions in defense spending
be driven by strategy and rigorous analysis, not by
the numbers alone.”7 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized the collaborative and inclusive effort of the military and civilians involved in fashioning the DoD’s new strategic
guidance and stressed that the document had “buy-in
among our senior military and civilian leadership.”8
The White House’s sensitivity to this problem is
apparent. In the cover letter President Obama signed
that accompanies the January 2012 DoD strategic
guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense, he states, “Going forward, we
will also remember the lessons of history and avoid
repeating the mistakes of the past when our military
was ill-prepared for the future.”9 The DoD, however,
is more transparent in its discussion of the new guidance. It underscored that one of its four basic guiding principles in formulating the strategic guidance
was to “avoid hollowing out the force.”10 In its view,
a “smaller, ready military is preferable to a larger
force that is ill-prepared because resources are not
made available for training, maintenance, and modernization relative to force structure.”11 Thus, for the
current DoD leadership, a hollow force is defined as
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preserving greater force structure than can be fully
equipped or adequately trained. Consequently, its
intent in devising the fiscal year 2013 budget was to
undertake suitable and discriminating reductions in
overall capacity and force structure, but to continue
making the investments needed to ensure that the U.S.
military remains “strong, agile, and capable.”12 Given
that commitment, the budget would protect resources
for force readiness to avoid a hollow force.13
The Obama administration’s attentiveness to the
possibility of being criticized for “hollowing out the
force” underscores the established view of the historical events surrounding the Carter administration
and thus reflects a particular political reading of those
events. However, that proposition needs to re-read.14
In the 3 decades since the first utterance of the term
“hollow army,” it is time for a more thoughtful examination of its meaning since it (and its variant, “hollow force”) has become a catchphrase in the American
political lexicon. Such an examination must take into
consideration the political context, but other factors
as well. These elements include the domestic political
and geostrategic environment during Carter’s presidency, the U.S. Cold War strategy during his term of
office, and the validity of the assertions made by military leaders regarding the readiness of U.S. forces to
perform their missions.
Setting the Stage.
On the morning of May 29, 1980, Samuel Stratton, a
Democrat from New York and chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee’s Investigations Subcommittee, called the subcommittee to order. Stratton, a
conservative with a reputation for supporting large
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defense budgets helpful to the businesses and military installations in his district, framed the purpose of
the hearing in his opening remarks. While the intent
was seemingly innocuous, to examine the national defense funding levels for fiscal year 1981, he laid out
his concern in a more dramatic fashion. He claimed
that the subcommittee for the “last couple of years”
questioned “whether the uniformed military leaders
were actually being consulted” by the President and
the Secretary of Defense and “whether their advice was
being followed (emphasis added) in connection with
the more important military decisions being made by
the administration and the Pentagon.”15 He and the
other committee members maintained that Carter ignored the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s advice, resulting in a
“very unfortunate situation since, if you are going to
have advisors but consistently don’t take their advice,
something is radically wrong and needs changing.”16
Stratton then articulated what had really prompted the hearing. The President and the Secretary of
Defense, in what was likely an unprecedented step,
had written directly to the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee urging the Senate to delete many of the “add-ons” that had been included in
the legislation the House of Representatives had ratified. Stratton was particularly incensed with Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown’s letter. Brown contended
that the increased funding the House Armed Services
Committee recommended ($5.1 billion) created “a serious imbalance in the President’s defense programs,
places unique undue stress on our scarce economic resources, and jeopardizes the added military capability
we all seek.”17 Brown then specified the objectionable
additional items in the House defense authorization
bill. The President sent a similar letter stating his opposition to specific defense programs.18
5

Stratton viewed the content of these letters as an
insult to the House of Representatives and an attack
on the Armed Services committee. The administration
was charging the Committee with being irresponsible.19 He wanted to know what advice the President
and Secretary had relied on to come to these conclusions, particularly when the President had only recently stated that the United States was confronting
the “greatest challenge [to its] national security since
Pearl Harbor.”20
Stratton then posed a series of questions to the
Service chiefs about the letter and the President’s proposed fiscal year 1981 defense budget, beginning with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C.
Jones, followed by Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew
Allen, and then Army Chief of Staff General Edward
C. Meyer. Meyer would become the central figure in
this budgetary tug of war between the House Armed
Services Committee and the Carter administration.
Meyer informed Stratton that he was not aware
of Secretary Brown’s letter until a week before when
he read about it in the newspaper and had received a
copy of the letter only recently. Brown had not consulted with him about its contents. Stratton then asked
if it was Meyer’s personal opinion that the additional
funds jeopardized the nation’s defense. Meyer replied,
“No, sir, not in the case of the Army. I have testified
before your committee, and others, that I think we
have inadequate funds to provide the type of Army
we need. I believe the requested funds are not excessive. We need more to do the things we have to do in
manpower and modernization.”21
After nearly an hour of questioning by the subcommittee members present, Stratton recognized
Representative Gillespie V. “Sonny” Montgomery,
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a Democrat from Mississippi. Montgomery was not
a member of the subcommittee, but the chairman of
another Armed Services subcommittee. Montgomery, a major general in the Mississippi Army National
Guard, was strongly pro-defense like Stratton.
Montgomery recounted to Meyer how he had just
returned from Fort Hood, Texas, where he had talked
with personnel in the infantry and armored divisions.
He noted that the number of tanks in each company of
the armored division was below the authorized level,
12 tanks per company instead of the requisite 17 per
company. Meyer responded that his impression was
correct. Montgomery repeated Meyers’ words, “That
is correct.” Meyer continued:
Right now, as I have said before, we have a hollow
Army [emphasis added]. Our forward deployed forces
are at full strength in Europe, in Panama, and in Korea. Our tactical forces in the United States are some
17,000 under strength. Therefore, anywhere you go in
the United States, except for the 82nd Airborne Division, which is also filled up, you will find companies
and platoons which have been zeroed out.22

The questioning of the Joint Chiefs continued with
Representative Robin Beard, a Republican from Tennessee, summarizing the subcommittee’s views and
the overall tone of the hearing:
I think the straw that breaks the camel’s back is a letter from the Secretary of Defense and a letter from
the President which read like third-grade readers. It’s
an insult. These letters are an insult to the Congress;
they’re an insult to the military leadership; and they’re
an insult to the American people. These letters are absolutely, totally insane.
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Beard then went on to question whether Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander had the courage
to appear before the subcommittee in a few weeks.23
Shortly thereafter, Stratton adjourned the hearing. It
had lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, but it was hardly
the end of the issue.
The headline for the front-page article in the Washington Post the next morning read, “Joint Chiefs of
Staff Break with Carter on Budget Planning for Defense Needs.” George Wilson, who wrote the article,
led with a sentence that claimed the Joint Chiefs had
broken publicly with their commander in chief “by
declaring that President Carter’s new defense budget
[fiscal year 1981] is not big enough to meet the Soviet
threat.” While Wilson admitted that the Chiefs had
been “dragooned into the battle of the budget” by Stratton, he followed that observation with the Meyer quotation, which Wilson termed “the bluntest response.”
He further quoted Meyer as stating, “I don’t believe
the current budget responds to the Army’s needs for
the 1980s.” Wilson then added another Meyer quote:
“‘There’s a tremendous shortfall in the ability to modernize quickly,’ in response to the Soviet threat.” Later
in the article, Wilson quoted Meyer as stating that
while forces in Europe were at strength, the units in
the United States had inadequate numbers of combat
soldiers. Meyer told the subcommittee members that
there was a shortfall of approximately 20,000 soldiers
and the nation was either “going to have to go to the
draft, or an adequately resourced all-volunteer force.
Today we have neither.”24
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What Does Hollow Mean?
The dictionary definition of hollow is “enclosing
an empty space, not solid.”25 The connotation was that
by 1980, the U.S. Army was an empty vessel, fragile,
and when hit forcefully, would easily shatter. In the
years since Meyer uttered that term, analysts have examined this issue and interpreted his statement. One
interpretation from the late 1990s is that Meyer’s comment referred to a lack of qualified personnel and the
imbalance that existed between the number of Army
divisions and the number of personnel available to
fill those divisions.26 Another, more contemporary,
construction is that “hollow” refers to a point where
“military readiness declines and the military lacks
the financial resources to provide trained and ready
forces, support ongoing operations, and modernize.”
However, even analysts who define the term in this
broad manner interpret Meyer’s comment as stemming from a “difference between a force that merely
looks good on paper and one that is properly staffed
and trained.” In their view, Meyer’s comment relates
to personnel shortages, “that many units had insufficient troops. . . .”27 Are either of these interpretations
valid?
The article by Washington Post writer Wilson that
incited the political conflagration presents a misleading picture. Wilson quotes Meyer as stating that the
fiscal year 1981 Defense budget did not respond to the
“Army’s needs for the 1980s,” and that a “tremendous
shortfall” existed in the Army’s “‘ability to modernize
quickly’ in response to the Soviet threat.” However,
Wilson’s quotes are from different points in Meyer’s
testimony. Meyer’s statement about modernization
was in response to Representative Robin Beard who
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asks the following leading question: “You have a tremendous shortfall, do you not, in the Army procurement budget?” To which Meyer replies, “We have a
tremendous shortfall in our ability to modernize the
Army quickly as I believe we must in order to respond
to the threat.” Here Meyer is offering his professional
judgment regarding modernization, but he does not
elaborate on why a shortfall exists with respect to
the capacity to modernize rapidly. Second, the threat
Meyer refers to is ambiguous. It is a likely reference
to the Soviet threat, but that is not explicit. Even if it
is the Soviet threat, it is unclear what aspect of that
threat is of concern and in what region of the world
this threat is considered a problem.
As indicated earlier, Meyer made his comment
about the hollow army in response to Montgomery’s
question about the number of tanks in an armored division specifically with respect to a unit at Fort Hood,
Texas. After he remarked, “we have a hollow Army,”
Wilson did not include the following words from the
testimony which are important and worth reiterating:
Our forward forces are at full strength in Europe, in
Panama and in Korea. Our tactical forces in the United
States are some 17,000 under strength. Therefore, anywhere you go in the United States, except for the 82nd
Airborne Division, which is also filled up, you will
find companies and platoons which have been zeroed
out.28

In response to a follow-on question from Montgomery, Meyer stated that the Army has a shortfall in the
number of personnel in the combat arms branches (infantry, armor, and artillery). He then added:
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Although from a pure numbers point of view, if you
believe pure numbers, enlistments for the combat
arms are up this year because that is where we focused
our recruiting effort. Right now, we have filled the infantry requirements.

This statement alone raises pertinent questions that
the committee members do not investigate. First, why
would the Army Chief of Staff doubt the numbers of
his own Recruiting Command? Second, did the Army
recognize that it would be thousands of personnel
short of its requirements, and, if so, why did it wait
until the current year to concentrate its recruiting efforts on the combat arms? Third, if it is 17,000 personnel short, how did such a shortfall occur and how
could it be remedied? Further, even if there was such
a shortfall, did it mean that U.S. Army forces were incapable of executing their responsibilities as directed
in U.S. national security policy and strategy? Lastly,
had the risk of having such a shortfall been examined
in view of U.S. defense commitments? To answer
these questions, it is necessary to examine Carter’s defense policy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) strategy, the commitments the United States
had made to NATO, and the Carter administration’s
defense budgets to provide the resources to meet
these commitments, including such issues as force
readiness and recruiting the all-volunteer force after
the cessation of the draft.
Carter’s Defense Policy.
In mid-February 1977, less than a month after his
inauguration, President Carter directed a comprehensive examination of (1) U.S. national strategy, and (2)
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capabilities (Program Review Memorandum [PRM]10). With respect to the second component, Carter
directed Secretary Brown to examine a range of alternative military strategies and construct alternative
military force postures and programs, including their
budgetary implications, in support of the strategies.29
Three months later in early May, Carter made his
initial overseas trip to Great Britain, meeting first at
an economic summit with heads of G-7 and then attending the NATO summit.30 Carter, in his address to
the other leaders at the NATO summit, issued a call
for increased defense spending by NATO members,
thereby setting the character and tempo for the meeting and restoring vital American leadership in the alliance, after the turbulent U.S. entanglement in Vietnam.31
Within weeks after the NATO summit, on June
5, 1977, Brown submitted the PRM-10 Force Posture
Study. The study developed alternative integrated
military strategies (AIMS) in five areas: (1) a NATOWarsaw Pact (WP) conflict in Europe (including
NATO flanks and the North Atlantic); (2) operations
outside Europe during a NATO-WP war; (3) operations in East Asia; (4) peacekeeping activities and potential local wars; and (5) a U.S.-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) nuclear conflict. The study
authors made six fundamental assumptions regarding
U.S. policy and the international environment: (1) the
Soviet Union posed the principal threat to the security
of the United States and to its global interests; (2) the
United States would continue to view the security of
Europe as a vital interest and would continue to participate actively in the defense of NATO, which the
WP threatened; (3) the United States would continue
to regard aggression against Japan as a threat to vital
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interests; (4) the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
the Soviet Union would not achieve a rapprochement
adequate to permit a sizable decrease in forces arrayed
against each other; (5) that as long as Sino-Soviet antagonism endured, the United States would not need
to obtain specific conventional forces to oppose a PRC
military threat; and (6) in an interdependent environment the United States would continue to have major
global interests.32 However, as noted by the study authors, the security of Europe against the WP was the
principal aim of U.S. defense policy:
Without such a threat, U.S. military strategy would be
profoundly different. No matter what outcome may
result from MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], there will still remain a threat and a need for
NATO military forces; and the U.S., with its strategic
nuclear capability, will play a leading role in NATO.33

Further, the study emphasized that the outcome of
a conventional war in Europe depended on the “deterrent value of our theater and strategic nuclear forces
as well as the warfighting capabilities of U.S. general
purpose forces—and those of our Allies.”34 WP planners had to consider the “prospect of nuclear escalation as a hedge against unexpected conventional failure.”35 NATO’s conventional force posture depended
highly on nuclear forces designed to deter nuclear attacks, and “NATO nuclear forces were generally considered adequate for deterrence of any immediate Pact
escalation to this level of warfare.”36 The study found
little to indicate that U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK)
forces could not defeat a surprise North Korean attack
on South Korea, provided the Soviets and Chinese
provided logistical support only.37 Although the study
did not reach any specific conclusions or recommen13

dations about the various alternative strategies, it was
clear that the primary thrust of U.S. military strategy
should remain the defense of Western Europe.
On August 24, 1977, Carter signed Presidential
Directive/National Security Council-18, U.S. National Strategy. The directive noted U.S. advantages
in “economic strength, technological superiority, and
popular political support” and the administration’s
determination for the United States to “maintain an
overall balance of military power between the United
States and its allies on the one hand, and the Soviet
Union and its allies on the other, at least as favorable
as that that now exists.” To that end, it would seek to
counterbalance Soviet military power and influence
in three key areas: Europe, the Middle East, and East
Asia. Further, Carter claimed that the United States
would “fulfill its commitment to its NATO allies to
raise the level of defense spending by approximately 3
percent per year in real terms along with our allies.”38
In effect, Carter retained the national defense strategy of his predecessors, Presidents Richard Nixon
and Gerald Ford—one and a half wars—a major war
in Central Europe and a minor war in East Asia (Korea).39 This concept would remain U.S. strategy until
early 1980 when events in the Persian Gulf catalyzed
changes. Thus, from the beginning of the Carter presidency, the focus was on winning the one and a half
wars specified in the strategy. The Chairman of the
Joint Staff and the service chiefs, including Meyer’s
predecessor General Bernard Rogers, agreed to its
findings, especially the conclusion that the emphasis
should be on NATO. Further, the Carter administration made no reductions of the Army’s force structure
of 24 divisions (16 active divisions and 8 reserve divisions) that the Ford administration had decided on in
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fiscal year 1975 nor of the number of units dedicated
to the defense of NATO. Rogers had made a decision
during his tenure as Chief of Staff to increase the number of Army personnel in Europe so that they would
be over-strength, understanding fully that to attain
this personnel level in that theater, units in the United
States would be at less than full strength.40 In increasing the number of active component to 16 divisions,
the Ford administration sought no increase in personnel ceilings, and the Congress did not offer to fund
such an increase. In essence, the Ford administration
added three divisions to the Army’s force structure
without a commensurate increase in personnel. The
Army, according to a 1977 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, exacerbated this problem by inadequately planning for this reorganization. Further, it
may have activated too many units prematurely since
units activated more than 1 year earlier still did not
have the proper mix of personnel and equipment to
conduct effective training.41 To compensate, the Army
increased its combat forces by cutting back on the support structure of the active component and by relying
on the reserve component to replace the sustaining
capability traded off in the active component.42 The
Army in 1973, under then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, made a deliberate decision to
implement the Total Force concept by integrating the
reserves into the active component. The active force
could not deploy without calling up reserve units.
Abrams held that this concept would force politicians
to call up the reserves, which President Lyndon Johnson had refused to do during the Vietnam War.43
In a series of studies that the Ford administration
commissioned during its 2 and 1/2-year tenure, it was
apparent that the deficiency in Europe was not per-
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sonnel but supplies such as ammunition, fuel, etc. U.S.
Army forces in Europe did not have sufficient supplies
and other materiel to execute the wartime plan. The
NATO plan called for stabilizing a defensive line in
Central Europe, holding this position and then awaiting forces from the United States to counterattack
and recover the lost territory.44 Holding ground until
reinforcements arrived, however, required sufficient
supplies to sustain European forces for weeks. Consequently, the Carter administration increased spending
on war reserve supplies in Europe.
Carter’s Defense Budgets.
Carter’s presidential campaign pledge was to reduce the defense budget by $7 billion and submit a
balanced budget in fiscal year 1981. Secretary Brown,
while respectful of Carter’s goals, believed that the
reductions should be more moderate. Shortly after
Carter’s inauguration, Brown and Bert Lance, Carter’s
director of the Office of Management and Budget, proposed cutting almost $3 billion from the defense budget that would be acceptable to the armed services,
slowing the procurement of major weapons systems
but not terminating them.45 Carter accepted the proposed reductions, but he felt that Brown had not undertaken the type of budget review he had wanted.
However, less than 3 weeks later, Carter submitted his
proposed revisions to the Ford administration’s fiscal
year 1978 budget proposal, announcing “the planned
increase in defense spending has been reduced while
our real military strength is enhanced.”46
As one analyst observed of the revised budget proposal, Ford had requested a defense budget of $123
billion, $13 billion more than the previous year, or

16

an increase of $7 billion (6 percent) allowing for inflation. Further, the Ford budget would have shown
real growth of $16.5 billion, or 16 percent, from fiscal year 1975 (considered the turning point in defense
expenditures), most of which would have been earmarked for investment in new military hardware and
expansion of research and development. “President
Carter’s amendments to the 1978 budget would not
change this picture very much.”47 While the Carter administration trimmed the budget, the revised figure
left real growth at about 3 percent. Further, the Carter
budget put less emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons and more weight on readiness of military units
for combat, required better examination of the costs
associated with expensive weapons, and signaled a
continued resolve to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in Europe.48 Carter believed that the duplication
of weapon systems among the services was costing
the U.S. Government $50 billion or more per year and
blamed the Joint Chiefs and service rivalry for expensive hardware.49 Overall, the Carter administration’s
revised defense budget did not constitute “a clear
departure in force planning” or “necessarily presage
future reductions in military spending. In effect, the
new administration had not yet articulated the direction of its defense planning.”50 It is important to note
that the fiscal year 1978 budget was principally a Ford
administration financial plan. The Carter administration had a mere few weeks to review and modify the
Ford proposal.
Carter’s campaign promise to reduce defense
spending went largely unfulfilled during the remainder of his tenure although critics have argued the opposite. Their arguments, however, are based on two
questionable claims. The first is that Carter’s proposed

17

defense spending over the 5-year defense program
(the DoD projects its budgets 4 years into the future
and the upcoming fiscal year) were less than the Ford
administration’s proposal.51 This is true, but it is also
misleading. The President proposes a budget to the
Congress; he is making a request. There is no reason
to assume that Congress would have merely acquiesced to Ford’s request. Additionally, the only year
for which the claim has any validity is the upcoming
fiscal year. Funding for the future years is simply a
proposal for how funds will be allocated taking inflation into consideration.
The second claim is that Carter’s defense budgets
did not show any real growth, i.e., increases after allowing for inflation. It is important to recall that during Carter’s tenure, the economy was in recession and
Congress was under intense pressure (as was the President) by the electorate to fight inflation by balancing
the budget.52 Inflation was running at double digits
and was difficult to forecast with any precision; it was
driving up the costs of fuel and the weapons in development and production, but it was also eroding a
substantial part of the increases in defense spending.53
Nonetheless, in fiscal year 1980, Carter kept his promise to his NATO allies by increasing real defense outlays by 3.1 percent. Joseph Pechman, an expert on the
federal budget, characterized the growth as a “sharp
increase in defense spending. . . .”54 The evidence is
also clear that the fiscal year 1981 budget increased
defense spending ($8.1 billion in real terms over fiscal
year 1980).55
There was also little sentiment in Congress for
boosting military spending until 1980 (the fiscal year
1981 budget), when Iranian revolutionaries took
American Embassy personnel hostage in November
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1979 after deposing the Shah months earlier, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
Congress reduced Carter’s first three budget requests
(fiscal year 1978-80) by a total of $6 billion.56 In addressing the issue of real growth, according to the
Carter administration’s inflation estimates, the administration’s proposed fiscal year 1981 budget request of
$158.7 billion represented real growth of 5.4 percent
over the $138.6 billion that it expected to spend in fiscal year 1980, after Congress passed a 1980 supplemental funding bill the administration requested.57 In
other words, the Carter administration was not only
requesting a budget with real growth, but it was also
maintaining its commitment to NATO of 3 percent
real growth per annum.
The proposed fiscal year 1981 budget for the Army,
the one General Meyer claimed was inadequate, contained funding for large-scale production of several
expensive Army weapons intended to counter the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority, especially in central Europe.58 These weapons included the new XM-1
tank, armored troop carriers equipped with anti-tank
missiles, additional stand-alone anti-tank missiles,
howitzers, and laser-guided artillery shells that could
home in on a tank 10 miles away, production of largescale rockets that were also designed for anti-tank purposes, anti-tank attack helicopters, the Hellfire missile
which the attack helicopter would carry, as well as
funding to modernize a portion of the Army’s existing
M-60 tanks with a more accurate gun-aiming system.59
In terms of funding readiness, another Army concern, Congress made substantial cuts in the fiscal year
1980 operations and maintenance account, the account
that funds this activity. The DoD fought energetically
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to protect its fiscal year 1981 request. However, the
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee had
long considered this account as packed with wasteful programs that made it opportune for trimming
without damaging national defense. Its hearings on
the proposed budget indicated negligible change in
its position.60
Regarding Army procurement funding, Congress
reduced the requested funding for aircraft, missiles,
and tracked combat vehicles for fiscal year 1978.61 In
the fiscal year 1979 request, however, Congress added
funding for aircraft, but reduced the funds requested
for missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons. As noted by Congressional Quarterly, in fiscal
year 1979, essentially Carter’s first budget, Congress
demonstrated “no fundamental disagreement with
the administration’s plans for providing U.S. forces in
Europe with more sophisticated weapons.”62 For fiscal year 1980, Congress approved the Army’s planned
procurement of tracked combat vehicles with the exception of the M-60 tank, which it cut by approximately 75 percent and instead, added funding for modernization of the existing inventory of M-60 tanks.63
In view of changed circumstances in the strategic
environment, the Carter administration’s fiscal year
1981 budget request was not an aberration in terms
of maintaining U.S. military capability. For example,
its fiscal year 1979 budget request reflected its priority
to increase the U.S. capacity to conduct an air/land
war in Europe, consistent with its defense strategy of
contributing to NATO’s ability to deter a Warsaw Pact
attack on Western Europe. In the view of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it accomplished this objective “while maintaining at current levels the U.S.
capacity to ‘project power’ elsewhere.” The funding
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for enhancing NATO capability sought to remedy the
apparent misallocation of ground forces in Central
Europe, move additional U.S. forces to Europe quickly
at a time of crisis, secure additional funding of military construction funds to preposition equipment for
one division and procure equipment to improve the
coordination, agility, and staying power of U.S. forces. Overall, the fiscal year 1979 request emphasized
ground forces for NATO.64
As to fiscal year 1980, President Carter continued
to honor the U.S. commitment to NATO to increase
defense spending by 3 percent in real terms. The development and procurement of new weapons and associated facilities were the primary area where there
was significant real growth in the 1980 defense budget. In the Army, the major increases were for missiles
and tracked combat vehicles. Funding for missiles
increased $485 million or 63.5 percent because of initial production of the Patriot Air Defense Missile and
the General Support Rocket System (GSRS) and large
increases in the production of the Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) antitank missile
and the Roland air defense missile. Funds requested
for Army weapons and tracked combat vehicles increased by 25 percent or $378 million. This increase
was largely due to the introduction of a new family
of armored combat vehicles (the Infantry and Cavalry
Fighting Vehicles) that were now ready for production, with substantially higher unit costs than the vehicles they replaced. The Carter administration trebled
the number of XM-1 tanks planned for procurement.65
The fiscal year 1980 budget also requested funds:
(1) to accelerate the rate at which the Army could
deploy heavy divisions (those with tanks and other
heavy equipment) to Europe; (2) to enhance the readi-
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ness of “home-based and forward-deployed forces”;
(3) to maintain forces for a prolonged conflict (sustainability) by building sizable stockpiles of materiel in
Europe, a commitment the Carter administration initiated in 1979; and, (4) to maintain funding for reserve
components at its fiscal year 1979 level of $2.7 billion since the Army deactivated some active support
units to supply personnel for the three new divisions
and two new brigades established during the Ford
administration.66
Further, Meyer’s concerns were apparently addressed, at least to some degree, since the fiscal year
1981 defense budget included funds for large-scale
production of several expensive Army weapons intended to counter Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe, readiness, and recruiting and retaining a quality
force.67 Meyer admitted in a 1988 interview that the
Army obtained a “big plus up” in the fiscal year 1981
budget based on his plea to President Carter.68 Thus,
an examination of the three fiscal year budget requests
for which Carter was responsible indicates that there
were indeed substantial increases in the Army’s budget for modernizing the force and for ensuring it could
fulfill its responsibilities as specified in the defense
strategy.
Recruiting the All-Volunteer Force.
The other major concern General Meyer mentioned
in his testimony was the lack of sufficient personnel.
He believed that recruiting had been made more difficult by Congress’ decision to end the Vietnam-era
G.I. bill, which contained attractive educational benefits. Additionally, the Ford administration made the
reduction of funding for recruiting a major element of
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its fiscal year 1977 budget request because of “escalating manpower costs.” For example, the proposed
fiscal year 1977 budget reduced enlistment bonuses
from $72 million the previous year level of $29 million. There were also reductions to funds for advertising.69 General Maxwell Thurman, the commander
of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command from 1979 to
1981, recounted years later that the rationale for these
decreases was that “recruiting resources as a whole
were thought to be at least adequate, if not excessive,
and those became targets for cost-cutting.”70
The recruiting problems that the Army confronted
were not solely the result of funding decisions. As
early as 1974, analysts recognized a “declining civilian
manpower pool” due to demographic changes as well
as new attitudes among the general population about
military service that arose with the end of conscription in June 1973. Now, the military had to compete
for qualified personnel in the marketplace and had to
retain in its ranks sufficient numbers of qualified personnel at a cost that the American public was willing
to support.71
In 1977, a few months after Carter’s inauguration, Lieutenant General Harold Moore, the Army’s
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, told senators on
the Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on
Manpower and Personnel, “Today we have a combatready active force of which the nation can be justifiably proud.” Moore also stated, “Furthermore, for the
first time since the end of the Vietnam War, all major
combat units achieved their personnel readiness goals
during fiscal year 1976.” Moore admitted that since
January 1976, there had been a downward trend in
quality and that the Army was not meeting its recruiting objectives for nonprior service males. He contend-
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ed, however, that the Army believed that these trends
could be reversed and that required active component
end strengths could be maintained at required levels over the next few years. Additionally, there were
problems in recruiting for the reserve components.
The Army had inadequate recruiting resources for
fiscal year 1977, which needed to be rectified along
with pay, bonuses, and benefits to attract and retain
personnel. Moore recognized as well that the success
in meeting recruiting goals depended on a favorable
recruiting environment.72
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel
in March 1978, Lieutenant General DeWitt Smith, the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Moore’s successor, indicated that there were challenges in recruiting
for the reserve components and that the recruiting
pool of males 17-24 years of age was small. Only one
out of four young men was qualified and available
for service. He noted as well that there was a declining market and a waning interest in military service.
“Nonetheless, the Army believes it will continue its
recruiting success.”73 Smith also addressed a salient
point about readiness: “While it is not necessary that
all our units be maintained at the same state of readiness all the time, a suitable number must be prepared
to engage in localized conflict with little or no warning. The remainder of the active and reserve component forces must be maintained in a sufficiently high
state of readiness to permit response to a major conflict within the pre-attack warning time we expect our
intelligence system to provide.”74 Smith’s testimony
specifically discussed the criticality of Army units being capable of defending NATO.
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A year later, in March 1979, Smith’s successor,
Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, testified before the
same Senate subcommittee that the Army had only
a small shortfall, 3,062 soldiers, below its authorized
strength in fiscal year 1978. The Army was also requesting Congress to provide a slightly higher level of
end strength in fiscal year 1980 over its 1979 level, but
Yerks noted, “Significant combat readiness and early
deployment enhancements are programmed. Combat
power in NATO will be improved. . . .”75 He too stated,
and referred to testimony by then Army Chief of Staff
Rogers, that the “Total Army strength is derived from
a scenario involving the defense of NATO.”76
In April 1980, the picture that Yerks, now with
General Meyer as Chief of Staff, presented to the
House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee
on Defense, was dramatically different. He warned
that “current manpower shortages merit close attention” and that the fiscal year 1981 request “reflects
recognition not only of that competitive market, but
also the need to provide a long-term remedy in addition to short-term ‘fixes’ on existing shortfalls.” Yerks
stated that the active component was able to maintain
its strength within 1 percent of the authorized levels,
through almost 6 years of the volunteer environment.77
However, toward the end of fiscal year 1978, the
Army was no longer meeting its recruiting objectives.
The situation deteriorated further in fiscal year 1979
despite Army initiatives and additional funding Congress had provided for recruiting. Fiscal year 1979
ended with Army strength of 15,444 soldiers fewer
than the congressionally authorized end strength.
Thus, this dire situation was not because of a lack of
funding but rather because the market for recruiting
had changed—a declining age 17-to-22 male popula-
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tion and increased competition with the other military
services, civilian employers, and colleges and universities. Additionally, the Army was experiencing a
downward trend in both the number of high school
graduates and recruits in the upper mental category, a
trend in evidence since fiscal year 1976. Now it would
have to increase its accessions to compensate for the
existing shortfall and the need to bring new personnel
into its ranks, an increase of 35,000 over its fiscal year
recruiting level. Thus, the Army requested increased
funding for recruiting and legislative authority for increasing enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for fiscal year 1981.78 But what was actually occurring was
more disturbing than even these trends. The Army
Recruiting Command was recruiting the least desirable candidates, aiming to recruit 17-year-olds without a high school diploma, and lowering its standards
in other regards to increase volume.79 Meyer became
so distressed about this situation that in November
1979, with 2 weeks of notice, he told Major General
Maxwell Thurman that he was being reassigned as the
commander of the floundering Army Recruiting Command, which not only was failing to meet its recruiting goals, but suffering the ignominy of being charged
with cheating.80 The Carter administration was equally concerned about the Army’s failure to recruit sufficient enlistees. A Carter political appointee in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense helped Thurman by
introducing the general to first-rate advertising consultants, which Thurman appreciated.81 Thurman is
largely credited with being the principal architect of
the all-volunteer Army and developing the recruiting
campaign that eventually turned around the service’s
recruiting problems.82
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Assessing Readiness.
General Meyer warned that a substantial number
of Army divisions were not fully capable because of
personnel deficiencies. Journalist James Kitfield reported that in 1979, Meyer informed the President
that only four of 10 active divisions stationed in the
United States were capable of deploying overseas in
a contingency.83 In fact, the historical record indicates
Meyer brought this issue to the attention of the commander in chief and Secretary Brown at a November
24, 1979, meeting at Camp David with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other service chiefs.
The meeting lasted 3 hours.84
At the meeting for which there is no transcript but
which Meyer recalled in an 1988 interview, he told
the President and the others present that there were
adequate Army personnel to create only four divisions, although there were 12 divisions in the Army’s
force structure. He also stated that the Army’s budget was insufficient and had told Carter and the others, “We had a hollow army. Hollow people. Hollow
equipment. Hollow sustainability. Hollow quality. I
pleaded for more money.” He later added in that same
interview:
That was the only year of the 4 years of the Carter administration there was any sort of [resource increase].
The last couple of years President Carter was in office, because of Afghanistan, [and] Iran, were all good
years, because from then on we got lots of money for
the defense program.85

These two sentences contradict each other.
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What is evident from statements General Meyer
made in the 1988 interview is that he was concerned
about the portion of the defense budget allocated to
the Army: “What you look at then is seeing where
you get your fair share of conventional resources.”
He later commented in that same interview that the
U.S. Army was not receiving its “fair share chance at
the resources.” When he met with Carter in November 1979, he told his interviewer, “I pleaded for more
money. Out of that budget, we did get more money.”86
Surprisingly, Carter merely remarked in his diary
about the meeting with the Joint Chiefs:
. . . in general all were pleased with what I had done
since I’ve been in office. They thought the ‘81 budget
as now being discussed was adequate, and that there
had been 15 years of neglect before prior to my administration.87

It is odd that such a stunning revelation regarding the
number of capable divisions did not compel Carter to
make note of it in his diary. Whether General Meyer
specifically informed the President that only a few
U.S.-based divisions were ready for deployment to
Europe in response to a contingency is unknown exactly, and the record remains contested. Nonetheless,
President Carter, at least according to Meyer’s own
words in the 1988 interview, met the Chief of Staff’s
plea for additional funding.
Meyer’s claim remains a perplexing comment.
Such degradation in readiness is unlikely to have
come about in the 5 months between Meyer’s becoming Chief of Staff and the Camp David meeting. Further, if force readiness was in such a dire condition, it
is a stinging commentary on his predecessor’s tenure
to have allowed such a development and to fail to ad28

dress it. Overall, anecdote has once again been given
credence as persuasive, empirical evidence.88 However, the historical record does present an uneven picture of the state of Army readiness leading up to the
May 1980 hearing.
In June 1978, during classified testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and
Readiness, then Lieutenant General Meyer as Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)
gave no indication that Army forces were not capable of executing its responsibilities in the defense of
NATO. The hearing transcript reads, “Back here in
the States we have our combat units reasonably well
oriented for the first 30 days [of combat].” Meyer does
indicate his concern with the later deploying reserve
units as “not ready to meet requirement dates, and it’s
principally today because of their inability to man that
force.” He reiterates later in his testimony that “the active forces forward deployed and the CONUS [continental United States] reinforcing forces, those that are
required for the first 30 days, are in reasonably good
condition.” Moreover, he is asked the question: “By
D+30 how many active divisions could be in Europe?”
Meyer responds: “With 4 to 8 days warning, we could
have 12 to 13 divisions there.”89 There is no comment
during the hearing that the reinforcements from the
United States are not ready for combat.
In January and February 1979, General Meyer, still
in his capacity as DCSOPS, and the Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ADCSOPS),
another general officer,90 made classified presentations to U.S. students at the U.S. Army’s Command
and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, and in neither case did the two generals make
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mention of readiness deficiencies. Meyer states in the
script for his January presentation that “manpower”
levels are “okay in the AC [active component],” but
a “severe problem in RC [reserve component].” The
most important point Meyer makes concerns readiness reporting. He remarks that the old readiness reporting system had been changed because it “was not
believable by reporters and readers.” The ratings were
“seen as too high, too many assumptions, and unrelated snapshots (past vs. present vs. future).” The script
indicates that the “new system eliminates causes”:
“equipment readiness now reported against monthly
average, assumptions removed, motion picture over
time.” Overall, the initial reaction to the new system
is “positive but some fixes required.” Readiness “ratings [are] lower because more things are measured
and unit authorizations have changed—most active
component units have dropped one ‘C’ rating.” In
other words, with the introduction of a new readiness
reporting system, most units are now evaluated as
less ready than previously. Recognizing this change,
Meyer states that the emphasis will be on improving
the readiness of units based in the United States that
are committed for deployment to Europe, both active
and reserve units.91
On February 1, 1980, Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander and General Meyer, now as Chief of
Staff, presented the Army’s posture statement before
the House Armed Services Committee. The text made
clear that readiness measurements “are not precise,”
but they “do provide a framework for assessing the
Army’s strengths and shortcomings.” The text also
noted that force readiness “does not in itself determine battlefield effectiveness,” that other factors pertain.92 While both the posture statement and Meyer’s
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testimony suggest there were shortcomings, neither
the document nor Meyer raised the issue of “hollowness” or an inability of the Army to execute its missions. One of the subcommittee members mentioned
the unfavorable impact that House Appropriations
Committee reductions in the Army’s operations and
maintenance budget accounts have had on training
and supplies, with which the general agreed. General
Meyer later mentioned that he was not satisfied with
the level of training in the Army, noting that the training is “spotty,” that there had been progress but not to
the degree he would have preferred.93
Testifying before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, 4 days later, General Meyer reiterated that while the fiscal year 1981
advanced the Army’s capabilities, “there is still considerable to do.”94 He also stated that as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was not “satisfied that we
have sufficient air, land, or sea forces to respond to the
needs of today.” Further, “I do not personally believe
that there are adequate land forces to meet our portion
of the defense requirements today.” He stated that
budget restrictions were the reason, later observing
that Congress had a role in setting those same authorized personnel levels, but admitting that the Army
was having trouble meeting the current levels owing to recruiting shortfalls deriving from inadequate
compensation.95 Meyer also noted for the record how
the Army’s budget request had been developed, concluding that the “Army’s $39.1 billion budget request
is the result of the Secretary of the Defense’s and the
President’s best judgment as to the optimum use of
resources to insure the defense of the Nation.” Meyer
informed one member that the budget request was
not, in his judgment, satisfactory.
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In a written reply for the record on what an adequate request would be, he stated that the amount
would be substantial, as high as six billion dollars, but
the officially requested amount was the best balanced
program the Army could achieve within the FY 81
Federal Budget request.”96 He also informed the subcommittee members, responding to a question as to
whether the Army was “ready to go to war today,”
that:
. . . right now the forward deployed units [Europe, Korea, and Panama] are in excellent condition [emphasis
added]. . . . As the Secretary indicated, the later deploying units are less ready [emphasis added]. So, in
responding to your question, it depends on the scenario. There are certain shortfalls, and I won’t get into
details, that respond to specific scenarios.97

In a closed session the next day with the same subcommittee, Meyer repeated his belief the United States
had improved its capability for a war in Western Europe, but expressed concern about contingencies in
other parts of the world. However, he also mentioned
Secretary of Defense Brown’s remark that resolving
the imbalance between U.S. and Soviet conventional
capability required several years of adequate funding.98
In late February 1980, Meyer testified before the
Senate Armed Services Committee noting that the
fiscal year 1981 budget request had been developed
before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and that
in his view, the “Army’s portion of the budget is inadequate in several areas.” However, with respect to
responding to the events in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the Army, he commented, has maintained a
sizable unit set aside for use if needed with sufficient
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support capability. The issue was one of how rapidly
it could deploy and here the Army depended on the
Air Force’s and Navy’s assets.99 The general also noted
that the United States did not have sufficient forces to
meet its worldwide commitments, and that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had made this point consistently.100 In
executive session, Meyer indicated that the forwarddeployed units were fully capable but underscored
that the units to reinforce NATO did not have adequate personnel to be at the highest level. He estimated that the cost to meet all requirements adequately
would be an additional $2.005 billion dollars in fiscal
year 1980 (supplemental funding) and $2.653 billion
in fiscal year 1981, with most of the funding devoted
to procuring additional new equipment.101 Meyer’s
testimony before May 1980 makes no mention of hollowness. In fact, it portrays realistically strengths and
weaknesses in the Army’s capabilities without resorting to histrionics. Thus, the “hollow army” comment
seems out of place; it certainly remains inconclusive,
given the other testimony that a poor state of readiness actually prevailed.
Readiness reporting is crucial to understanding the
issue of a “hollow army.” A review of GAO reports
on the subject clearly underscores the Army’s difficulties in assessing the readiness of its forces. As early as
December 1977, the GAO identified several problems
with military readiness reporting:
The interpretation of readiness reporting criteria was
not uniform; the condition of equipment was not properly reported; the reporting system did not adequately
reflect capability for each mission, and the reports did
not always contain adequate information.

Additionally, the GAO stressed the inability of readiness reporting to relate readiness to funding require33

ments. While improvements were underway, further
steps were necessary to overcome deficiencies that
the audit agency had identified previously. The GAO
noted that the Army was already implementing major
new reporting procedures. A year earlier, the GAO
reported that the Army had serious flaws in its systems for identifying the resources that combat units
needed.102
In 1978, GAO found that the Army’s personnel requirements for combat units were unreliable because
of faulty planning factors. The Army was using a system that “produced unacceptable results.” The GAO
also concluded that the Army recognized the problem
and was trying to correct it, but the proposed solution
would eliminate only some of the system’s weaknesses.
The problem persisted into 1980 when the GAO again
reported that Army systems for identifying, monitoring, and reporting combat units’ requirements were
not accurate. Consequently, billions of dollars could
have been wasted purchasing and maintaining the
wrong equipment, providing the wrong skills to soldiers, disseminating resources to the wrong locations,
and designing an Army that was “not organized and
equipped to meet its mission.”103 The GAO questioned
the validity of the reports that the Army was using
to judge its readiness, which Chief of Staff Meyer defined in an October 1979 presentation as training and
maintenance, not personnel levels. However, General
Meyer did observe that manning the Army was the
first of two major challenges: all the military services had recruiting shortfalls in 1979 but this could be
overcome by adequate funding.104
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Modernizing the Force.
According to General Meyer, the Army’s second
major challenge was modernization of its combat
equipment. More specifically, the problem was introducing the new generation of combat equipment into
the “hands of the troops in sufficient quantities.” In
his view, all of the new items, which included combat
vehicles, air defense systems, helicopters, radars, communications, and electronic warfare gear, were badly
needed because over the preceding decade, the Army
had lost its qualitative equipment lead to the Soviets.
He contended that the fielding of these new systems
would regain that advantage.105
However, the issue of modernization was not just
a matter of fielding new systems in sufficient quantities for Army forces. The Army had made a number of
missteps in developing and producing these systems
long before the Carter administration had taken office. When the Vietnam War ended, the Army began
developing several new systems. However, development problems disrupted the plans the Army had for
introducing them. The Army cancelled the MBT-70
tank and the Cheyenne helicopter programs because
of cost and complexity, which meant, as analysts
observed, that the Army had to “virtually start over
again.”106 Further, the GAO in several reports identified problems with several of these new weapon systems. The XM-1 tank’s reliability and durability had
not been proven according to a January 1980 report
although procurement of the Army’s first increment
of 110 tanks had begun; doubts remained despite
modifications to improve acknowledged flaws.107 The
GAO also voiced concerns about the Army’s Infantry
Fighting Vehicle in a February 1980 study. It exam-
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ined the vehicle’s performance in operational and development testing, noting the vehicle could not meet
the Army’s ballistic protection requirements. This was
a crucial deficiency since the vehicle was intended to
provide infantry units with mobility in a combat environment with better armor and increased firepower
compared to the existing armored personnel carrier.108
Further, in June 1980, the GAO observed that Congress, the military, and industry expressed concern
that many of the new weapon systems were too technologically complex to permit a reasonable degree of
confidence that they would function properly when
needed. GAO held that the sophistication of many
of the systems contributed to “budget problems, inventory shortfalls, and a low state of readiness for
certain combat categories.” GAO agreed that the
military should seek the advantages of technologically advanced weaponry as opposed to less complex,
lower-performing, or cheaper weapons. However, it
believed that a better balance between performance
and reliability was needed. The XM-1 tank was one
of the systems cited as having reliability, availability, and maintainability problems, which could lead
to readiness issues since the equipment broke down
more frequently.109 Earlier that month, the GAO published a summary report of earlier reviews that identified problems with other Army systems: the Multiple
Launched Rocket System needed further testing before production; more critical data about the operational performance of the Division Air Defense System
(DIVAD) was needed before it should be produced;
and the Army should consider procuring additional
existing armored personnel carriers rather than Infantry Fighting Vehicles to improve dismounted infantry
capability.110 Although the Army wanted these new
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systems, there were recognized technological problems, and many were not ready for production before
fiscal year 1981. As the GAO emphasized, fielding unreliable systems would only add to readiness woes.
Some members of Congress worried about the
potential inflationary impact of the planned increase
in defense spending, particularly the fiscal year 1981
increase. The CBO urged a steady buildup in procurements to minimize “bottlenecks,” promote capacity
expansion, and enlarge the number of potential bidders so as to lessen inflationary pressures. In other
words, a dramatic increase in procurement would
exacerbate the already high inflation rate. The largest
fiscal year 1981 procurement program was for tracked
combat vehicles, especially the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which was being procured gradually in fiscal
year 1981, consistent with the manufacturer’s production capacity. Additional tooling investment would
be required to expand capacity as early as fiscal year
1983. The CBO also emphasized that in fiscal years
1980 and 1981, production of the XM-1 tank was “expected to proceed at rates consistent with Chrysler’s
capacity.”111
In short, procurement of systems at higher rates of
production was not feasible. As of May 1979, many
of the new systems were not mature enough to enter
low-rate production. The earliest some would enter
production was fiscal year 1979 and the latest was
fiscal year 1984, when development funding for the
15 new systems declined rapidly. To accelerate the
production over that same period would have required “about a fivefold increase in their procurement
funding.”112
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Contextualizing the “Hollow Army.”
Army General Frederick Kroesen, who served
as Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe during
Meyer’s tenure as Chief of Staff, wrote an article in
1999 asking the question, “What is hollow?” As Kroesen notes, the definition appears uncomplicated: hollow refers to “the discrepancy between ‘spaces’ and
‘faces’ in the Army structure.” However, this is too
simple an answer. Kroesen states that such an assessment requires detailed analysis of priorities, operational requirements, and the use of military personnel
for duties other than their assigned mission.113 This is
the issue raised at the May 1980 hearing. Yet, it was
dealt with in a perfunctory manner. Members of the
subcommittee never asked for details or evidence, and
never asked General Meyer a crucial question about
the level of strategic risk the United States was willing to assume to meet its commitments. In essence,
the hearing met its political intent of embarrassing the
Carter administration, but shed no light on the issue.
Carter’s relationship with Congress and members
of his own party in both chambers was often acrimonious and sometime venomous from the earliest
days of the administration. As Julian Zelizer points
out, in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate era,
“the situation on Capitol Hill would have been difficult for any president regarding how well, or badly,
they interacted with legislators.” Legislative reforms
enacted to curb presidential power were anathema to
the executive branch.114 Moreover, not only had congressional reforms upset the power within the institution, but among the Democrats in Congress. Carter’s
close advisor Hamilton Jordan stated that there was
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“no unifying Democratic consensus, no program, no
set of principles on which a majority of Democrats
agreed.”115 Speaker of the House and Massachusetts
Democrat Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill and other congressional leaders distrusted Carter because they believed
the Georgian, a political outsider they did not know
well, failed to support their political interests.116 Carter made this situation worse. His first step after inauguration prompted disharmonious relations when he
eliminated more than 300 water projects from the last
Ford administration budget. He considered these to
be congressional “pork” but members of both houses
deemed them critical to maintaining favor with their
constituents.117 Relations between Carter and congressional Democrats worsened a year later because the
President’s fiscal conservatism angered old-line congressional Democrats, who believed that the most important duty of the government, especially during an
economic downturn, was to ease social and economic
burdens, even if that meant producing budget deficits.118
The atmosphere with respect to defense issues was
often poisonous, especially by 1980. The May 1980 subcommittee hearing is emblematic of the House Armed
Services Committee’s tendency to increase defense
budget requests and willingly modify administrative
programs, which in turn affected executive priorities.
One analyst claimed that by the time of the 96th Congress (January 3, 1979 to January 3, 1981), even the
Senate Armed Services Committee was “behaving like
a hostile guerrilla force [ambushing] key White House
initiatives.”119 Although the Democrats held a majority on the committee, Republican Senator John Tower
with assistance from some hard-line anti-Communist
Democrats such as Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson
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continuously chipped away at the power of committee
chairman Senator John Stennis. Although he retained
sufficient influence to support the President’s goals
on most occasions, he did not enjoy a substantial level
of control because Jackson and two other Democrats
often sided with the Republicans. One staff member
declared that Carter’s aims were “out of step with that
of the committee and the Congress.” The majority of
the committee became increasingly determined to increase defense spending.120 Senator Ernest Hollings, a
Democrat from South Carolina, weighed in as a strong
supporter of increased defense spending when he assumed the chairmanship of the Senate Budget Committee in May 1980. He had fought with Stennis in the
past over increased defense spending and was now in
a position to set the defense budget levels.121
The “rise of the New Right,” that is, the increasing political power of conservatives also had an influence on the public perception of Carter’s positions on
defense. In the 1976 contest for the Democratic nomination for the presidency, conservatives in the Democratic party supported Senator Henry Jackson, but
tended to give Carter the benefit of the doubt when he
was elected. However, the personal relations between
Jackson and Carter were strained due to wounds sustained in the primary battle between the two. Further,
the Carter administration rejected the names of several centrist Democrats for appointment to positions
within the government, with the liberal wing capturing the key appointments in the national security
apparatus.122 Thus whatever success Carter enjoyed
would owe very little to Jackson and the conservative
wing of the party.
The right wing group, the bipartisan Committee
on the Present Danger (CPD), had the most influence
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in portraying Carter as weak on defense. Paul Nitze,
one of the organization’s founders, had expected a position in the Carter administration, but did not receive
it. Certainly, Nitze’s bruised feelings may account for
some of the CPD’s animus toward Carter, but Carter
also rejected the Soviet-U.S. arms control prescriptions that Nitze and his CPD co-founder, Eugene
Rostow, had advanced. Although that issue would
be the major friction point between Carter and the
conservatives, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979 underscored the CPD’s argument that
Carter had naively underestimated the Soviet Union’s
aggressive objectives and the unparalleled Soviet military buildup.123 By the spring of 1980, 26 CPD members were among Republican presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan’s 68 official foreign and defense policy
advisors; nearly one-third were members of the Democratic Party.124 The CPD also proved to be a potent interest group, swaying public and elite opinion against
Carter’s foreign policy, which it perceived as a “selfimposed retreat from American global power and
leadership.” It fostered extensive contacts with the
news media, conducted speaking tours throughout the
United States, prepared issue statements, pamphlets,
and reports, and spent $750,000 to derail the second
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), as well as
supplying a huge pool of witnesses to testify before
Senate committees in 1980.125 The CPD also worked in
consonance with the American Security Council, an
organization with ties to military contractors, which
established a grassroots organizational offshoot to
lobby for “a strategy of peace through strength.”126
During 1980, a number of “horror stories” about
military readiness appeared in newspapers through-
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out the country, such as the New York Times, Washington Post, and smaller dailies.127 Mark Rozell shows
that the press’s assessment of the Carter administration became increasingly negative and “unflattering”
over the course of his term of office, resulting from
the journalists’ disenchantment with Carter’s leadership and performance. Rozell also contends that
most of the press coverage in 1980 was transparently
hostile toward the Carter administration, and Carter
was perceived as a “weakened” president. “This
negative press assessment contributed importantly to
an image of the administration in the public and in
Washington as incapable of effective leadership.”128
Carter was also accused of using a “smear campaign”
against Republican opponent Reagan, with the Carter
campaign portraying Reagan’s foreign policy stance
as bellicose.129 The Reagan campaign took advantage
of the negative press assessments of the Carter administration, particularly with respect to defense issues. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan continuously
charged that the Carter administration had allowed
U.S. military capability to become so perilously weak
that it invited Soviet aggression. He used the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis to
argue that increased defense spending was necessary
to overcome this decline in preparedness.130
Neutral Competency and the “Hollow Army.”
In 1994, the CBO determined that the term “hollow
army” had been distorted beyond General Meyer’s
meaning to the point that it now applied “not only [to]
shortages in experienced personnel but also shortages
of training, weapons, and equipment that undermined
military readiness during the mid- and late-1970s.”
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The CBO concluded, “Today, much of what is known
about the hollow force of that period is based on anecdotal evidence” and a press that “sensationalized the
impact of readiness problems on U.S. military capabilities.” Further, readiness woes were made public,
“perhaps intentionally,” on the part of some military
officers.131
The CBO’s final point is particularly pertinent.
There is a tendency by a majority of defense analysts
to adopt the “normative assumption that defense
policymaking should be above politics.” Consistent
with this belief is the notion that there is a proper balance between substantive expertise which should be
politically neutral, and accountability to and control
by elected officials. In the defense analysts’ view, defense policymaking and planning should be a rational
process free from political contamination. The very
essence of the principal-agent relationship, however,
negates this insulation from political contamination
in the defense realm, as there are multiple principals
with multiple goals.132 Playing politics with national
security is a serious charge, but it is a realistic element
of the budgetary process, especially as to the services’
concerns about their relative share of the defense budget.133 However, given the inauspicious connotations
associated with this behavior, and the myth of neutral
competence (traditionally viewed as nonpartisan and
objective134) regarding the U.S. military, such efforts
are felt to require dissimulation with a more disinterested pretext offered.
Samuel Huntington provided such a disinterested explanation. As he observed, Congress, one of
the principals, can play an independent role only if
it has access to the same professional military advice
available to the President. Further, with respect to the
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defense budget, members of Congress contend that
their constitutional responsibilities demand that they
be able to examine the President’s budget request in
the light of “the purely ‘military’ recommendations of
the Joint Chiefs.” Congress made it legally permissible
(under the 1949 amendment to the National Security
Act of 1947) for the first time for the Joint Chiefs to
present their views directly to Congress and thereby
exempted them from the restrictions of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921.135 In short, this exemption then gave the military an opportunity to offer
budget recommendations that were not in line with
the President’s request.
While Huntington argues that this legal milestone
places “a tremendous burden” on the Joint Chiefs “as
to whether to speak up or to remain silent,” he glosses over a more important issue of the service chief’s
other role as the representative of a particular military
service with its own organizational cultures, routines
and bureaucratic constituencies.136 As David Jablonsky indicates, it is fallacious to believe that a service
chief is:
. . . free to ignore the conditions of his office. In actual
fact, he [the service chief] remained in effective control of his service only so long as he retained its confidence, which could be quickly lost if he was perceived
to have abandoned his role as service spokesman in
the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff].137

This spokesman role includes being its advocate, when
necessary, for larger levels of funding and policies that
support larger budgets to procure additional capabilities, especially new equipment and force structure.138
Further, organizations themselves struggle to attain
the capabilities they believe are essential to their “es44

sence as an organization,” including the “funds necessary for capabilities and missions.”139
Meyer was fully cognizant of this role, being no political innocent or stranger to the responsibilities of the
Army’s chief. It is clear from statements he later made
in a 1988 interview that he was concerned about the
portion of the defense budget allocated to the Army.
As Chief of Staff, he tried to persuade the chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Stennis, to establish a land power subcommittee to ensure
that the Army got its “fair chance at the resources”
as opposed to the Air Force and Navy Departments,
which each had specific subcommittees dedicated to
their concerns.140
Thus, defense policy is an arena of public policy,
as Daniel Wirls points out. The “military constitutes a
historically embedded professional bureaucratic class
unlike that in any other area of policy” and is part of
the “governing apparatus.” As such, the military has a
say in the formulation of policy because of the connection between policy and military power, which seeks
to maintain the United States as the preeminent world
power. Military superiority is both an abstraction and
a reality that “has had distortional effects as politicians
and policymakers resort to tropes, clichés, and tradition instead of analysis, rarely feeling compelled to
justify what is taken for granted.” The “hollow army”
is just such a trope, for it signals that any decrease in
spending or a reluctance to increase funding is interpretable as a threat to security.141 Moreover, military
power is understood relative to that of other nationstates and the perception of threats and the necessary
response. There are no clear measuring devices to determine reliably and accurately the relative strengths
and weaknesses of an opponent.
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Thus, while the military can offer expert assessments, it is the civilian leader who has the authority
and responsibility to determine whether the risk is acceptable, to determine priorities, and to weigh the effects on the body politic.142 It is ultimately a matter of
judgment, but that judgment is not politically neutral
as there are numerous stakeholders interested in the
military budget including industry, Congress, politicians throughout the federal system, and the military. Senior military officers, especially service chiefs,
are political actors attempting to secure resources
for their constituents, despite often being viewed as
having only the national interest at heart. In the eyes
of the authorization committees, service chiefs have
substantial prestige and influence, particularly when
the military and the congressional members’ interests
converge.143 As one of Carter’s predecessors, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, remarked: “Each service . . . has traditionally had at its head people who think that their
service is the only service that can ultimately save the
United States in time of war. They all want additional
manpower and they always will.”144 This was certainly the case with respect to the “hollow army” debate.
Interpreting the “Hollow Army.”
The “hollow army” episode is fundamentally an
argument over policy, an argument as to whether the
U.S. Army had sufficient human, financial, and material resources to execute the Carter administration’s
defense policy and strategy as specified in Presidential Directive 18. To portray this issue solely in terms
of poor civil-military relations, or of the “good” soldier versus the “misguided” or “bad” politician, is not
only simplistic, but it privileges one narrative over the
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numerous other respectable narratives that existed. To
construe the issue exclusively as one of military professionalism versus civilian control of the military is
also narrow and inaccurate. The point of contention
over the Army budget did not result from fractured
relations between General Meyer and the Secretary of
Defense. On the contrary, relations between Secretary
of Defense Brown and Meyer were genial. When Meyer returned to the Pentagon after uttering the term
“hollow army” at the hearing, Meyer claims he was
willing to resign over his remark but Brown dismissed
the idea, stating that Meyer “had to do what he had to
do.”145 Such a perspective also negates a more expansive, “interest-based” interpretation: a clash between
political classes who have disagreed over “the proper
course of action.”146 It reduces the issue to a medieval
morality play, a form of allegory in which the personifications of virtue and vice clash. Instead, this drama—conceding that a congressional hearing is a form
of political theater or a “political spectacle”—must be
understood from within a richer web of meaning.147
Policies are symbolic, and the policy process is
often viewed as a struggle over the symbols the actors summon. Interpretation and argument play primary roles in the policy process. Additionally, policies themselves are increasingly understood as largely
symbolic, a method of articulating latent concerns.148
In this particular situation, the congressional hearing
includes protagonists, dialogue, and the use of symbolic language (the metaphor of the “hollow army”)
all of which, as Robert Reich observes, ”gives voice to
these half-articulated fears and hopes, and embodying them in convincing stories about the sources and
the choices they represent.”149 The members of Congress and the witnesses are active coauthors of their
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own narratives. The Washington Post reporter elucidates the “play,” acting like a drama or literary critic,
contextualizing the event for the reader, the audience,
and interpreting the phenomena that have been acted
out in the hearing room. He also becomes a coauthor
in the narrative. Further, the texts, that is, the hearing
transcript, newspaper articles, and the spoken words
(storytelling), are historically situated and culturally
determined. In this real life drama, webs of meaning—beliefs, desires, and attitudes as well as values—
are present.150 Studying the history of this “drama” in
its historical context is critical to interpretation. It and
everyone and everything associated with it is part of
the larger ongoing narrative (hence the importance of
recontextualizing or broadening the context within its
historical situation beyond the hearing room), as each
plays the primary role within its own narrative.151
However, the congressional hearing and the statements made at the hearing are one narrative thread
within the context of the metanarrative that is the
Carter presidency.
To understand the action of others, we must understand this concept of narratives and their historically
embedded character.152 History is not solely objective
fact but is also “interpretation and memory.”153 This is
why the narrative associated with the “hollow army”
has been interpreted at the time and since to reflect the
values of the participants who share General Meyer’s
interpretation. The members of the committee had no
interest in delving into Meyer’s metaphor, for they
understood and agreed with it: “Telling people what
they want to hear in a context that makes the message credible.”154 To interpret it further would be to
diminish its political effect; it would be an attempt to
separate the poetic from the political, to paraphrase
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James Clifford.155 The poetic has potency; the metaphor is a means of making sense of the world. Meyer’s
pithy term fit the subconscious understanding of the
subcommittee members; his terminology provided a
“vocabulary in which a puzzling object [or situation]
could be related to other, more familiar objects, so as
to become intelligible.”156
Thus, the meanings (values, beliefs, and feelings)
that policies embody for their multiple stakeholders
and the ways those meanings are communicated are
central to understanding the “hollow army” episode.
Meyer created those meanings with his metaphor.
Murray Edelman writes that:
The critical element in political maneuver is the creation of meaning: the construction of beliefs about the
significance of events, of problems, of crises, of policy
changes, and of leaders. The strategic need is to immobilize the opposition and mobilize support.157

The essential tactic, he continues, “must always be the
evocation of meanings that legitimize favored courses
of action and threaten or reassure people so as to encourage them to be supportive or to remain quiescent.
Allocations of benefits must themselves be infused
with meanings.”158 The conflict over meaning is central
to the “hollow army” interlude. However, that meaning must remain ambiguous because the geostrategic
environment in which the argument occurs is uncertain and unknowable. Thus, it becomes the locus of
“disputed claims and competing symbols” with conflicting assumptions about the consequences of action
or inaction.159 It is not possible to establish the validity or the certainty of the positions that parties take
on an issue. The language invokes beliefs, and part of
this evocation is to frame the debate, even to identify
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a particular group as harmful,160 as the statements at
the congressional hearing suggest. This is part of the
performance. The spectacle that widely publicized political language constructs is highly dynamic, and the
content is socially structured and assembled through
an “evocation of unobservables in the present and potentialities in the future.”161
Language itself has a performance function, which
is made more potent “when it is masked, presenting itself as a tool for objective description.”162 Performance
language catalyzes thought and action. Its metaphors
are “figures of thought based on cognition and, therefore, with implications for action”163 because they are
connected to a literal concept or to a level of meaning
that is readily understandable by reference.164 In this
case, “hollow” was tied to the concept of a U.S. military unable to execute U.S. policy commitments, thus
associating hollow—a physical attribute— to a policy
objective. The metaphor, however, cannot be made
explicit because it will lose its potency, its value as an
incentive for action. The metaphor would be blatantly
ridiculous if taken literally.
Thus, over the course of 3 decades, the “hollow
army” story became the dominant account because
of a potent metaphor structured to articulate the
ambiguities surrounding this important policy issue
and to express through imagery the risks associated
with inaction. The metaphor became a most effective
means of communicating information, of illustrating a
point.165 The value of the metaphor for those who are
committed to its underlying message is that it can be
perpetuated across time for political purposes. Metaphor serves as an “artifact” that carries meaning for a
specific interpretive community.166 However, since it
is historically situated within a particular context and
culture, it is also vulnerable to decay in political dis50

course. Perspective can be gained only through distance and time from the event. After 30 years, it is time
to unmask the metaphor.
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